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INTRODUCTION 
The objective of our nation’s patent system is to maintain an equitable 
balance between the rights of individual innovators and the interests of the general 
public.1 Ideas are intangible knowledge goods that are characterized by high fixed 
costs of initial development and low marginal costs of production.2 Individuals in 
a perfectly competitive market would refrain from investing in the creation of new 
knowledge goods since they would not be able to recoup their upfront fixed 
costs.3 Patent law alleviates this concern by granting an inventor an exclusive right 
to market and license her knowledge good for a limited duration. These exclusive 
property rights confer market power upon the inventor and impose static 
efficiency losses on society.4 The underlying premise of patent rights is that 
dynamic gains from increased innovation and creativity outweigh the static 
efficiency losses arising from the legal creation of market power.5 The economic 
incentives conferred by the patent system are especially relevant to inventors 
within the biopharmaceutical sector, an industry that is burdened by enormous 
research and development (R&D) costs.6 The existence of gene patents may have 
played a crucial role in the rise of the biotechnology industry in the United States.7 
 
* J.D., 2013, University of California, Irvine School of Law; Ph.D., California Institute of Technology; 
B.S., Suffolk University. The author thanks Professors Christopher R. Leslie, R. Tony Reese, and 
Steven Nataupsky for their guidance and assistance throughout the development of this Note—“I 
remain your apprentice forevermore.” The author would also like to thank Dr. James J. Mullen III, 
who inspired her to pursue the subject matter two years ago, and Dr. Yimeng Dou and Azure’De M. 
Wilkins for their unwavering support. The author would also like to acknowledge Howard Tan and 
the rest of the Tan and Fernandes clans for believing in the dreams of their daughter. This Note was 
originally submitted and awarded third place in the 2012 IDEA Student Writing Competition. 
1. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13–14 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989); Giles S. Rich, The 
Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159, 175–77 (1942). 
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38, 42 (7th ed. 2007). 
3. Id. at 38. 
4. Id. 
5. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
6. Biopharmaceutical companies face significant risks in the research and development process 
because most or all of their investment will be lost. The patent system provides biopharmaceutical 
companies with a sufficient term of exclusivity to recoup sunk costs, prevent competitors from 
imitating their inventions, and generate adequate capital to invest in future drug development 
pipelines. James H. Davis & Michele M. Wales, The Effect of Intellectual Property on the Biotechnology 
Industry, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 427, 433–34 (F. 
Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (“If other companies were permitted to copy biotechnology or pharmaceutical 
products as soon as they were approved, no rational drug company would expend the cost and effort 
of developing new drugs.”); PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM. (PHRMA), Pharmaceutical Industry 
Profile 2011, PHRMA 15 (Apr. 13, 2011), http://report.nih.gov/investigators_and_trainees/acd_bwf/ 
pdf/Phrma_Industry_Profile_2011.pdf (“The biopharmaceutical industry is the most R&D-intensive 
manufacturing sector in the [U.S.]. In the last five years, these companies have invested $316 billion 
on research and development of new medicines.” (citation omitted)); see JANICE M. MUELLER, 
PATENT LAW 7 (3d ed. 2009). 
7. Many small but promising biotech firms probably would not have been able to attract 
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Indeed many advances in gene-based technologies—such as life-saving diagnostic 
tools and clinical therapeutics8—owe their existence to the patent system.9 But if 
left unchecked, the broad monopoly power wielded by gene patent holders can be 
detrimental to both the biomedical community,10 which is charged with 
innovating new technologies and providing access to such services,11 and the 
general public—the intended beneficiaries of such breakthroughs.12 
About twenty percent of human genes are currently patented,13 many of 
which are implicated in prevalent diseases including breast cancer, Alzheimer’s 
disease, and Huntington’s disease.14 These gene sequences comprise important 
research tools that are essential for the development and improvement of all gene-
based diagnostics and therapeutics. Gene patents are unique compared to other 
product patents because they cannot be designed around.15 Furthermore, there are 
 
venture capital funding without their portfolio of gene patents. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, 
Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 
139–40 (2001) (“[T]he biotechnology industry does engage in substantial basic research, and, to the 
extent that it does, its funding is most likely to come from venture capital. Indeed, most 
biotechnology firms start out as venture-capital-financed ‘spin-outs’ from a university or research 
institute, beginning their existence as research and development companies that leverage relatively 
narrow technical expertise, as well as intellectual property, for both financing and limited amounts of 
revenue.”). For the purposes of this Note, the term gene patents is defined broadly to include patents 
on unaltered naturally occurring gene sequences that have been isolated from their source, isolated 
naturally occurring gene sequences that have been further modified by human manipulation, and 
artificially synthesized gene sequences (i.e., cDNA). 
8. RICKI LEWIS, HUMAN GENETICS 377–95, 397–416, 426–27, 433–46 (7th ed. 2007); TOM 
STRACHAN & ANDREW READ, HUMAN MOLECULAR GENETICS 497–716 (4th ed. 2011); J.D. 
WATSON, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE 303–07 (2003). 
9. Davis & Wales, supra note 6, at 428; Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical 
Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174–75 (1986) (showing that at least sixty percent of pharmaceutical 
inventions would not have developed without a patent system); Emily Marden et.al., Genomics and 
Intellectual Property: Considering Alternatives to Traditional Patenting, 17 HEALTH L. REV. 12, 16 (2008) 
(“[P]roducts such as instruments and protein therapeutics . . . are on the market because [of] the 
patent system. . . .”); Jasemine Chambers, Note, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United 
States, Europe, and Japan, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 224 (2002) (stating that the U.S. patent 
system has played a critical role in the growth of the multibillion dollar biotechnology industry). 
10. Throughout this Note, the term “biomedical community” refers to basic and clinical 
researchers in academia and the biotech/pharmaceutical industry, as well as health care practitioners. 
11. See Frederic M. Scherer, The Economics of Human Gene Patents, 77 ACAD. MED. 1348, 1364 
(2002) (“Developing new products that enhance human health and welfare should not be like walking 
through a mine field, with risk of severe consequences should a loosely-related patent claim be 
infringed.”). 
12. Lori Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 67 (2002) [hereinafter Andrews, Gene Patent Dilemma]; Lori 
Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE REV. GENETICS 803, 
803 (2002) [hereinafter Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy]. 
13. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCI. 
239, 239–40 (2005). 
14. Id. at 240; see Katrien Vlassak en Kees Schüller, The Effect of Patents on Research and 
Development of Diagnostic Kits, in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 99, 106–07 (Geertrui Van 
Overwalle ed., 2007). 
15. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
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no available non-infringing substitutes for gene sequences, allowing a gene patent 
owner to control the entire market for any given application of the patented 
gene.16 This phenomenon, commonly known as the “bottleneck effect” of gene 
patents, is disconcerting because gene patent holders can potentially determine 
which inventions are practiced.17 This effect is especially pronounced in the gene 
diagnostic market where the patentee holds the rights to a particular gene 
sequence and a genetic testing method that screens for mutations within the same 
patented gene.18 Such conditions enable gene patent owners to bar others from 
entering into a specific gene diagnostic market by refusing to license their patented 
gene sequences, an input that is necessary to compete within that market.19 
Consequently, entities that own the patent rights on disease-specific gene 
sequences can exercise complete control over the gene diagnostic market. The 
well-publicized controversy of Myriad Genetics (Myriad) and its unilateral refusal 
to license its patents on the breast and ovarian cancer genetic markers (i.e., the 
BRCA genes) epitomizes this exact trend. 
In 2009, over 240,000 American women were diagnosed with either invasive 
or noninvasive breast cancer, making it the most prevalent cancer diagnosis in 
women.20 The American Cancer Society reported that more than 21,000 women 
were diagnosed with ovarian cancer within the same year, accounting for three 
percent of all cancers among women.21 Mutations in the breast cancer 
susceptibility genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2) account for five to ten percent of all 
breast cancers.22 BRCA-positive women are also nine to thirty-five times more 
likely to develop ovarian cancer.23 Disease-causing BRCA mutations can be 
identified through genetic testing, which allows for early detection and treatment 
of ovarian and breast cancer. Genetic test results thus play a significant role in 
guiding medical decision making with respect to treatment options including 
 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 700 (1998) (“[T]he lack of substitutes for certain biomedical 
discoveries (such as patented genes or receptors) may increase the leverage of some patent holders 
. . . . Rivals may not be able to invent around patents in research aimed at understanding the genetic 
bases of diseases as they occur in nature.”). 
16. Id. 
17. See Lorelei Perez Westin, Note, Genetic Patents: Gatekeeper to the Promised Cures, 25 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 271, 273–74, 280–81 (2002). 
18. See Andrews, Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 12, at 89–91. 
19. See id.; see also Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical 
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 3–8 (2003).  
20. Cancer Facts and Figures 2009, AM. CANCER SOC’Y 9 (2009), http://www.cancer.org/acs/ 
groups/content/@nho/documents/document/500809webpdf.pdf. 
21. Id. at 16. 
22. Breast Cancer Facts and Figures 2009–2010, AM. CANCER SOC’Y 11 (2009), http://www 
.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@nho/documents/document/f861009final90809pdf.pdf. 
23. Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic 
Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 
GENETICS MED. S15, S19 (2010). 
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chemoprevention and prophylactic surgery,24 both of which result in gains in 
patient life expectancy.25 Although technological advancements have facilitated the 
early detection of breast and ovarian cancer via genetic screening, improvements 
in BRCA diagnostic testing have been stymied by the conduct of a single 
company. 
Myriad, a molecular diagnostic company based in Salt Lake City, is currently 
the sole provider of genetic tests that diagnose ovarian and breast cancers.26 
Myriad owns patents on its genetic testing methods27 and on naturally occurring 
BRCA gene sequences28 that have been isolated from human cells. The patents on 
the BRCA gene sequences effectively preclude the exploitation of gene-based 
technologies in diagnosing and treating both breast and ovarian cancers because 
exclusive ownership of a gene sequence essentially means that the patentee 
“own[s] the exclusive rights to that genetic sequence, its usage, and its chemical 
composition.”29 Myriad strategically used the bottleneck effect of its gene patents 
to deter both commercial and noncommercial30 laboratories from (1) conducting 
any existing form of BRCA testing31 and (2) developing new BRCA genetic tests 
for clinical use.32 
From a patent law perspective, the BRCA gene patents remain impervious to 
attacks because existing gene patents satisfy all the statutory requirements of 
patentability and their scope cannot be narrowed under existing patent law 
doctrines.33 Although the Myriad controversy culminated in an extensive legal 
 
24. These surgical categories consist of invasive and irreversible measures such as mastectomy, 
oophorectomy, or tubal ligation. 
25. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 23, at S15. 
26. The U.S. patent rights to the BRCA gene sequences were originally split between Myriad 
and OncorMed, a rival diagnostic company. Myriad acquired full control over the BRCA gene patents 
after waging a protracted legal battle against OncorMed. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 
702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); SHOBITA PARTHASARATHY, BUILDING GENETIC 
MEDICINE 115–20 (2007); Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 131–33 
(2002). 
27. U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed Mar. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 
1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995); 
U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995). 
28. U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 
1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995). 
29. Lamis G. Eli, Case Note, When Myriad Genetics Prohibited a Myriad of Options: Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 21 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 364 (2011).  
30. Two professors at the University of Pennsylvania designed tests to screen for BRCA 
mutations in their lab and provided screening to approximately five hundred patients per year starting 
in 1996. The faculty members ceased their BRCA testing efforts in response to Myriad’s cease-and-
desist letters. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 187. 
31. This was true even if the genetic testing protocols differed significantly from Myriad’s own 
patented testing methods. Id. at 204–05; see also PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 115–20. 
32. See Cho et al., supra note 19, at 3–8. 
33. The existing patents on gene sequences that are inputs to gene diagnostic testing and gene 
therapy fulfill the novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. 
v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming the patentability of 
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battle that challenged the patent eligibility of man-made BRCA gene sequences, 
the status quo of the BRCA gene patents ultimately remains unaffected.34 In 2011, 
the Federal Circuit in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO affirmatively held that 
any gene sequence that had been isolated from natural sources via human 
intervention constituted patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent 
Act.35 A year later, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision 
and instructed36 the Federal Circuit to reconsider the dispute in light of its recent 
holding in Mayo,37 where the Court established heightened restrictions on the 
patent-eligibility of processes or methodologies that exploit natural biological 
correlations. As a result, there was considerable speculation as to whether the 
Mayo limitations would extend to compositions of matter like isolated gene 
sequences. On remand, the Federal Circuit once again upheld the validity of the 
 
erythropoietin gene sequences); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming the 
patentability of Heparin-Binding Growth Factor gene sequences); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (affirming the patentability of Insulin-like Growth Factor gene sequences). These claimed 
gene sequences satisfy the novelty and non-obviousness requirements because they predate the release 
of the Human Genome project and would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art at the time of the invention. Gene identification was an extremely difficult feat in the 1990’s 
because gene-cloning technology was still at its nascent stage. In fact, it was not uncommon for 
researchers to spend anywhere from three to seven years to identify a particular gene sequence. See 
WATSON, supra note 8, at 303–06; see also LEWIS, supra note 8, at 434; STRACHAN & READ, supra note 
8, at 499. Existing gene patents also satisfy the heightened “specific” and “substantial” utility 
standards under In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and comply with the very high 
disclosure standard because the patent applications contain the actual sequence information of the claimed 
genes. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“No sequence 
information indicating which nucleotides constitute human cDNA appears in the patent . . . . [T]he 
specification does not provide a written description of the invention. . . .”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 
1164, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An adequate written description of a DNA requires more than a 
mere statement that it is part of the invention . . . ; what is required is a description of the DNA 
itself.”); see also Dan L. Burk, Tailoring Patent Policy to Specific Industries, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
1, 13 (2003) (“You must give us the DNA sequence if you want to claim a DNA sequence. You can’t 
[ just] tell us the function . . . [or] how to get that DNA sequence, even if you have really an assurance 
that method will work you’ve got to give us the structure.”). These high disclosure standards also 
provide assurance that courts will continue to construe gene sequence claims broadly, thereby 
diminishing a competitor’s chance of escaping infringement during litigation. Finally, the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents, a judicially created doctrine that theoretically narrows the scope of a patent, 
cannot successfully narrow the scope of gene patents given the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amgen. 
314 F.3d at 1351 (holding that the unlicensed use of patented gene sequences does not qualify for a 
defense based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents). The reverse doctrine of equivalents was initially 
espoused in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950), which stated 
that the reverse doctrine of equivalents shields an accused infringer from liability where the allegedly 
infringing device, although literally falling within the scope of the patent, “is so far changed in 
principle from the patented article that it performs the same or similar function in a substantially different 
way” (emphasis added). 
34. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
35. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
36. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 80 U.S.L.W. 3380 (Mar. 26, 2012). 
37. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 80 U.S.L.W. 4225 (Mar. 20, 
2012). 
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BRCA gene patents, explaining that “[w]hile Mayo and earlier decisions concerning 
method claim patentability provide valuable insights and illuminate broad, 
foundational principles, the Supreme Court’s decision[ ] in Chakrabarty . . . set[s] 
out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of compositions of 
matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”38 In Chakrabarty, the Court held that 
genetically modified bacteria qualified as patent-eligible subject matter because 
these man-made compositions had “markedly different characteristics” from their 
natural counterparts.39 Applying this test, the Federal Circuit found that isolated 
gene sequences were patent eligible under section 101 because their distinctive 
chemical structure and properties were “markedly different” from naturally 
occurring gene sequences in living cells.40 Thus, it appears that patent law in its 
current state is unlikely to curb the detrimental effects of broad gene patents. 
Perhaps, a more effective solution to the gene patent dilemma lies in 
antitrust law, which aims to promote innovation and maximize consumer welfare 
by proscribing the effects of monopoly power. Some scholars have suggested that 
antitrust law may play a role in alleviating the bottleneck effect of biotech 
patents.41 Using the Myriad controversy as a test case, this study analyzes whether 
a patent holder’s unilateral refusal to license its gene patents can give rise to 
antitrust liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Here, I apply two antitrust 
doctrines—“essential facilities” and “refusal to deal”—and conclude that Myriad’s 
unilateral refusals to license its BRCA gene patents do indeed violate section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. The Myriad controversy is an excellent illustration of a situation 
where a duty to deal should be imposed on the patent holder. Applying these 
antitrust doctrines to gene patents mediates the tension between providing 
adequate incentives for genetic research and circumventing the problems 
associated with patenting these indispensable resources. Part I of this study 
explains how broad upstream gene patents can impede downstream innovation 
and stifle market competition. Part II explains how the bottleneck effect of the 
BRCA gene patents can be significantly mitigated by the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine and the refusal to deal doctrine in antitrust law. Part III 
briefly describes how antitrust law may provide plaintiffs with much needed 
injunctive relief in the form of compulsory licensing. 
 
38. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1326 (citation omitted). 
39. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
40. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1328–30. 
41. Amy Rachel Davis, Note, Patented Embryonic Stem Cells: The Quintessential “Essential Facility”?, 
94 GEO. L.J. 205 passim (2005); Westin, supra note 17, at 271, 281–97; see, e.g., John H. Barton, Patents 
and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 450 
(1997) (“[P]revious work has generally emphasized intellectual property issues; yet, there are parallel 
and related antitrust issues.”); Sandeep Vaheesan, Reviving an Epithet: A New Way Forward for the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1, 38–40 (2010) (contending that essential facilities 
doctrine should be applied to a small segment of intangible assets including gene sequences that have 
acquired de facto natural monopoly status). 
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I. UPSTREAM GENE PATENTS: AN IMPEDIMENT TO DOWNSTREAM INNOVATION 
AND MARKET COMPETITION 
Advances in DNA sequencing technology and the completion of the Human 
Genome Project have revolutionized patient care by bringing many promising 
clinical applications to fruition.42 Such breakthroughs include gene-based 
technologies such as gene therapy, genetic testing, and personalized medicine, all 
of which harness the genetic information conveyed in a patient’s gene sequences. 
The number of gene patents grew exponentially in the 1990s43 after the landmark 
case Diamond v. Chakrabarty,44 in which the Supreme Court upheld the patentability 
of genetically engineered living organisms for the first time. Gene patents pervade 
the diagnostic, therapeutic, and biomedical innovation markets within the United 
States and are regarded as the “gatekeeper patents” because they constitute an 
indispensable input for every single gene-based technology.45 The scope of gene 
patents is extremely broad because the patent holder claims the isolated gene sequence 
as its invention. Thus, the patent owner’s rights are not restricted to the product that 
is generated by the method or process disclosed in the patent application. This is 
in stark contrast to the vast majority of patents where the actual market power of 
the patent owners is not as significant. For most patents, the prevailing property 
regime is not problematic because of the availability of non-infringing, functionally 
equivalent substitutes.46 So even though the intellectual property (IP) owner has 
an exclusive property right over a specific invention, it does not possess significant 
market power, because many other functional equivalents may compete in the 
relevant market.47 
The broad scope of gene patents and the absence of non-infringing 
substitutes for gene sequences allow patent holders to control every existing and 
potential application of their patented sequences. This excessive concentration of 
power in the hands of the upstream gene patent owner can adversely affect market 
competition, patient care, and innovation.48 Specifically, patent owners have the 
 
42. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 377–95, 397–416, 426–27, 433–46; STRACHAN & READ, supra note 
8, at 497–716; WATSON, supra note 8. 
43. Martin Enserink, Patent Office May Raise the Bar on Gene Claims, 287 SCIENCE 1196, 1196 
(2000); Tom Hollon, Gene Patent Revisions to Remove Some Controversies, 6 NATURE MED. 362, 362 
(2000). 
44. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
45. See Brian A. Jackson, Innovation and Intellectual Property: The Case of Genomic Patenting, 22 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 5, 11–12 (2003); Westin, supra note 17, at 280–81. 
46. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 (2006). 
47. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works/Unique Challenges at the Intellectual Property/Competition Law 
Interface, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 199, 200 (Claus-Dieter Ehlerman & 
Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2005). 
48. See Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research, 10 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 251, 251–88 (2008); see also Andrews, Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 12, at 89–91; Arti K. Rai, 
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right to (a) preclude the use of their relevant gene for diagnostic or therapeutic 
purposes, (b) prevent a physician from testing or disclosing test results for a 
disease-associated mutation, and (c) block improvements to existing diagnostic 
tests or therapy.49 The BRCA gene patent controversy provides a vivid illustration 
of how a dominant firm’s refusal to license its gene patents can result in each of 
these disconcerting effects. First, Myriad barred other clinical diagnostic labs from 
conducting any form of BRCA testing, even if the other labs were using 
completely different (and sometimes more accurate) methods50 of genetic testing 
that Myriad was not conducting at the time.51 Second, Myriad prevented clinicians 
from telling “patients involved in research the results of their [BRCA] testing, 
leading physicians involved in breast cancer care and research unable to meet their 
ethical obligations to provide genetic test results to research subjects, when 
requested.”52 Third, Myriad continues to use an expensive suboptimal gene testing 
method when cheaper and more effective BRCA genetic testing alternatives exist 
in Europe.53 
Overall, it appears that Myriad’s refusal to license its BRCA gene patents 
results in anticompetitive effects in the gene diagnostic market for breast and 
ovarian cancers. First, static efficiency is impaired because consumers pay higher 
prices than they would in a competitive market.54 Second, the dynamic efficiency 
in the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers is also impaired 
because (1) Myriad is not developing and marketing more comprehensive and 
cost-effective versions of BRCA genetic testing, (2) Myriad precludes others from 
developing novel or improved testing methods by refusing to license the BRCA 
gene patents, and (3) Myriad continues to use mediocre genetic testing methods 
which are lower quality when compared to similar genetic testing services in 
Europe.55 
Although Myriad’s questionable conduct exemplifies how gene patent 
owners can abuse their IP rights to hinder innovation and market competition in 
the biomedical field, the categorical ban of all gene patents is not the optimal solution to the 
 
Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 831–38 
(2001). 
49. See Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy, supra note 12, at 803–08. 
50. Myriad’s standard test originally consisted of full sequencing of the BRCA genes. Full 
sequencing of an entire gene can miss large rearrangements and thus yield false negatives. Other labs 
had developed tests that were more effective in detecting these large rearrangements. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
51. Id. at 205 (“In 2005, Dr. Matloff sought permission from Myriad for the Yale DNA 
Diagnostics Lab to conduct screening for mutations caused by large rearrangements, which Myriad 
was not conducting at the time. Her request was denied.”). 
52. Id. at 209. See PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 119. 
53. See infra notes 124–26. 
54. See PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 93–95; Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 23, at S16–
S17. 
55. See infra notes 124–26. 
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gene patent dilemma. This is because gene patents provide inventors with 
incentives to develop new products that exploit naturally occurring gene 
sequences in a way that either improves the existing properties of a gene sequence 
or bestows novel therapeutic properties. In other words, gene patents incentivize 
firms specializing in gene-based technologies to compete vigorously by developing 
(a) many tailor-made genetic products that combat specific diseases and (b) gene 
therapeutics that simultaneously combat multiple symptoms or multiple diseases.56 
Without patent protection, innovators may feel compelled to maintain their 
socially valuable genetic inventions as trade secrets in order to prevent others from 
free riding on their efforts. Such an outcome is unacceptable in the biotech field 
where technological advancements depend heavily on both the incentive-to-invest 
and incentive-to-disclose aspects of the patent system.57 Thus, despite the 
problems caused by existing gene patents, as indicated by the Myriad controversy, 
the abolition of all gene patents would be unwise given the potential for gene-
based inventions in enhancing public health. Instead the proper resolution to the 
gene patent dilemma lies in optimally balancing the interests of individual 
inventors with the needs of the biomedical community and the general public. 
This balance can be achieved by providing legal remedies under antitrust law to 
parties seeking access to essential patented gene sequences. 
II. ANTITRUST LAW: A SOLUTION TO THE GENE PATENT DILEMMA 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns the illegal acquisition of monopoly 
power by a dominant firm through unilateral conduct.58 A firm’s unilateral 
conduct rises to the level of monopolization under section 2 only if it satisfies the 
two-element test set forth in Grinnell: (1) the firm must possess monopoly power 
in the relevant market, and (2) the firm willfully acquired and maintained its 
 
56. See, e.g., Albert M. Maguire et al., Safety and Efficacy of Gene Transfer for Leber’s Congenital 
Amaurosis, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2240, 2240–48 (2008) (describing the treatment of an inherited 
blinding disease using a recombinant gene containing adeno-associated virus DNA and human 
RPE65 DNA); David L. Porter et al., Chimeric Antigen Receptor-Modified T Cells in Chronic Lymphoid 
Leukemia, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 725, 725–33 (2011) (describing how researchers designed a new 
gene that can be inserted into T cells to trick them into attacking cancerous B cells, the cause of 
chronic lymphocytic leukemia); Jocelyn Kaiser, Gene Therapy Halts Brain Disease in Two Boys, 
SCIENCENOW (Nov. 5, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2009/11/05 
-01.html. 
57. See David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology 
Research Tools by Implementing a Broad Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1022 (2004) 
(“For many [biotech] companies, a patent portfolio is the only potentially lucrative asset available for 
exploitation. These companies rely upon patent licensing revenues for much of their operating capital 
until they can develop a steady revenue stream. Thus, by granting expansive patent protection to 
biotechnological inventions, the government arguably subsidizes the biotechnology industry.”). 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony.”). 
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monopoly power by engaging in predatory or anticompetitive conduct.59 
Possession of monopoly power is not sufficient because a firm may legally acquire 
a monopoly through competition on the merits such as selling a superior product 
that is protected by patent rights. Patent owners, however, are not immune to 
antitrust liability just because they have legally acquired a monopoly through their 
patented inventions. Courts have held that patentees cannot use their exclusive 
rights to gain a monopoly in a market that is beyond the scope of the patent.60 An 
excellent example of this concept are tying arrangements—where a firm leverages 
its power in the market for a patented product (the tying market) to impair 
competition in a complementary market (the tied market) by effectively coercing 
buyers of the tying product to also buy the tied product from the firm at 
supracompetitive prices, regardless of the buyer’s preference.61 
Monopoly leveraging62 is linked to unilateral refusals to deal in some 
situations and may rise to the level of exclusionary conduct that is subject to 
antitrust liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act.63 Although unilateral 
 
59. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
60. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (condemning 
tying arrangements involving patented products because “the patent holder cannot use his statutory 
right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the scope of the patent”); 
see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[A] patent 
owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the 
marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”). 
61. Tying arrangements may be illegal under either section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 3 
of the Clayton Act if:  
(1) there are two separate products, a “tying” product and a “tied” product; (2) that those 
products are in fact “tied” together—that is, the buyer was forced to buy the tied product 
to get the tying product; (3) that the seller possesses sufficient economic power in the tying 
product market to coerce buyer acceptance of the tied product; and (4) involvement of a 
“not insubstantial” amount of interstate commerce in the market of the tied product. 
Technical Resource Serv. v. Dornier Med. Sys., 134 F.3d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Tic-X-Press, 
Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1414 (11th Cir. 1987)). For tying arrangements involving 
patented products see Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1947); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. 
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942). 
62. The term “monopoly leveraging” has two separate definitions in the context of antitrust 
law. On one hand, a firm that is a monopolist in one market has engaged in monopoly leveraging 
when it uses its power to gain an unmerited competitive advantage in a second market. Christopher R. 
Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam’s Razor: A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 727, 732 (2004). Alternatively, monopoly leveraging can refer to situations where a firm 
exploits its dominant position in one relevant market to eliminate competition and illegally expand its 
monopoly power in a related downstream or parallel market. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical 
Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29 (1992) (“[P]ower gained through some natural and legal advantage such 
as a patent . . . can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to 
expand his empire into the next.’”) (quoting Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 
594, 611 (1953)); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
516–17 (1985). For the purposes of this Note, the term monopoly leveraging refers to the latter 
definition. 
63. Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 
9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 195 (1999). A principal issue in monopoly leveraging cases is 
defining the two relevant markets. In other words, there would be no monopoly leveraging if the 
UCILR V3I2 Assembled v8.7 (Do Not Delete) 1/22/2014  4:12 PM 
442 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:431 
 
refusals to deal do not typically involve coercion, they can sometimes achieve the 
same damaging effects on market competition as tying arrangements.64 A 
dominant firm in a primary market can effectively diminish competition in a 
downstream or complementary market by denying competitors in that market 
access to its primary product, which “essentially forces buyers of the primary 
product to also buy . . . the complementary product [from the firm] because the 
lack of competition in the complementary market leaves buyers with no other 
choice.”65 
Myriad satisfies the first prong of the Grinnell test because it possesses 
monopoly power in the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. 
Monopoly power, also known as market power, is “the power to control prices or 
exclude competition”66 and can be proven by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence.67 An antitrust plaintiff must define the relevant market, show that the 
defendant owns a dominant share of that market, and show that there are 
significant barriers to market entry and barriers to expansion in order to 
demonstrate market power circumstantially.68 The relevant market in the present 
case is the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers in the United 
States. This market completely belongs to Myriad because (1) the BRCA genes, 
thus far, are the only well-established genetic markers for assessing predisposition 
toward breast and ovarian cancers within the medical community;69 (2) Myriad 
owns the patents on the BRCA genes; and (3) Myriad does not license its BRCA 
genes to competing diagnostic labs, allowing it to remain the sole provider of 
BRCA testing. The product market should not be expanded to include the entire 
 
alleged primary and secondary markets constitute a single integrated market. See infra Part II.A.5 for 
an explanation of why gene sequences and the gene diagnostic services are distinct antitrust markets. 
64. Lao, supra note 63, at 196. 
65. Id. 
66. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
67. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).  
68. Id. 
69. Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 account for five to ten percent of all breast cancers. 
Breast Cancer Facts and Figures 2009–2010, supra note 22, at 11. BRCA-positive women are also nine to 
thirty five times more likely to develop ovarian cancer. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 23, at S19. 
Researchers have recently identified new genetic markers linked to breast and ovarian cancers, but the 
risk factor conferred by some of these markers appears to be much lower compared to mutations in 
the BRCA genes. Bert Gold et al., Genome-Wide Association Study Provides Evidence for a Breast Cancer Risk 
Locus at 6q22.33, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4340 (2008); Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 
New Genetic Marker for Breast Cancer Identified, SCIENCEDAILY (Mar. 4, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily 
.com/releases/2008/03/080303190610.htm (“[T]he risk associated with [the 6q22.33] genetic marker 
is much lower than that of BRCA genetic mutations . . . .”). Alternatively, the risk factor conferred by 
the new genetic markers is dependent on the risk associated with the BRCA genes. Antonis C. 
Antoniou et al., Common Variants at 12p11, 12q24, 9p21, 9q31.2 and in ZNF365 are Associated with Breast 
Cancer Risk for BRCA1 and/or BRCA2 Mutation Carriers, 14 BREAST CANCER RES. R33-1, R33-5–R33-
12 (2012); Fergus J. Couch et al., Common Variants at the 19p13.1 and ZNF365 Loci are Associated with 
ER Subtypes of Breast Cancer and Ovarian Cancer Risk in BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutation Carriers, 21 
CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 645, 645–57 (2012). 
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gene diagnostic market because each gene possesses unique biological properties 
and is not functionally interchangeable with another gene. Specifically, different 
genes perform different physiological roles within a living organism and mutations 
in different genes can result in different pathologies. Since individual genes cannot 
substitute for each other, the product market should be confined to the gene 
diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, the court held that ninety percent of the market constituted monopoly 
power.70 Myriad is the sole provider of gene diagnostic tests for breast and ovarian 
cancers in the United States and thus possesses one hundred percent of the 
market share. Other firms are unable to compete in the gene diagnostic market for 
breast and ovarian cancers because Myriad’s BRCA patents operate as absolute 
barriers to entry. No other party can compete in the relevant market unless they 
have permission to use the patented BRCA gene sequences. Because of its status 
as the upstream gene patent holder, Myriad has the ability to increase the price of 
BRCA testing services without consumers switching to a substitute product. 
Therefore, Myriad possesses the requisite monopoly power in the BRCA gene 
sequence market71 and the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers 
in the United States. 
The second prong of the Grinnell test is concerned with whether Myriad’s 
unilateral refusal to license its patents on the BRCA gene sequences constitutes 
monopoly conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act. A unilateral refusal to 
license may constitute monopoly conduct if the monopolist’s asset serves as a 
necessary input (i.e., an essential facility) in a downstream or complementary 
market.72 An essential facilities claim thus focuses on the monopolist’s status as the 
owner of an essential facility. Alternatively, a unilateral refusal to license may give rise 
to antitrust liability under section 2 if the refusal helped the monopolist to acquire 
or maintain market power by foreclosing competition.73 The latter approach is 
generally referred to as a refusal to deal claim and is narrower than an essential 
facilities claim because it focuses on whether the monopolist engaged in 
exclusionary conduct that contributes to monopolization.74 The following illustrates 
how Myriad’s unilateral refusals to license its BRCA gene patents can be 
characterized as anticompetitive through the application of (a) the essential 
facilities doctrine and (b) the general refusal to deal doctrine. 
 
70. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). 
71. See infra Part II.A.1. 
72. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991). 
73. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 482–83 (1992); United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
74. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.3d (2d ed. 2012). 
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A. Essential Facilities Doctrine Offers a Well-Tailored Solution for Imposing Antitrust 
Liability on Gene Patent Holders who own an Essential Input for Competition  
in Downstream Gene Diagnostic Markets 
Essential facilities doctrine (EFD) is one possible antitrust approach that 
addresses the anticompetitive effects of unilateral refusals to license an IP right. 
This doctrine is unique because the monopolist’s status as the owner of an essential facility 
rather than any affirmative conduct determines antitrust liability.75 EFD imposes 
antitrust liability when a monopolist that controls an essential facility for 
competition denies reasonable access to a product or service that other firms must 
obtain to compete with the first in a downstream or related market.76 The 
canonical EFD fact pattern involves a vertically integrated company that has 
exclusive control over some facility, and leverages that control to gain an 
advantage over competitors in a downstream or complementary market.77 EFD 
appears to be a well-tailored solution for compelling an upstream patent holder to 
provide access to gene sequences that are essential to competition in multiple 
downstream markets that exploit genetic information such as diagnostics, 
therapeutics, and innovation.78 With respect to the gene diagnostic markets for 
breast and ovarian cancers in the United States, Myriad controls an essential 
facility in the form of the BRCA gene patents. Myriad has denied reasonable 
access to the facility by refusing to license the gene sequences to competing 
downstream researchers in the gene diagnostic markets, thus depriving these 
competitors of an input that is absolutely necessary to compete in the gene 
diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. 
The legal principles underlying EFD are rooted in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Terminal Railroad Ass’n and Otter Tail Power Co.79 In Terminal Railroad, a 
group of terminal companies who jointly owned the only existing railroad bridge 
into or out of St. Louis refused to give competing railroads access to the 
 
75. Id. § 13.3c. 
76. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d at 542.  
77. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377–79 (1973); United States 
v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 393–99 (1912); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983). 
78. The application of EFD to patentable gene sequences is not far fetched especially since 
another study advocated for the application of EFD to make patented embryonic stem cells accessible 
for the development of downstream innovation markets. Davis, supra note 41. The argument is more 
compelling in the case of gene sequences because unlike embryonic stem cells, gene patents are (1) 
not nonexclusively licensed and (2) create a larger bottleneck effect because gene sequences have 
applications in the diagnostic, therapeutic, and innovation markets. 
79. There is some debate over whether EFD provided the basis for these decisions. The 
Supreme Court has asserted that it has never explicitly recognized the doctrine. Verizon Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004). However, the EFD literature 
seems to suggest that the underlying principles of essential facilities were alluded to in these decisions. 
See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 443, 445–48 (2002) (discussing the Terminal Railroad, Otter Tail, and Aspen Skiing cases). 
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facilities.80 The Court held that such a refusal constitutes a violation under section 
1 of the Sherman Act because of the essential nature of the single railroad bridge to 
the operations of all railroads in the St. Louis area.81 Although scholars point to 
Terminal Railroad as the original ancestor of EFD, the doctrine truly began to take 
shape in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States. In Otter 
Tail, a public utility company that owned all the transmission lines into several 
municipalities refused to either sell electricity wholesale or wheel (i.e., carry) 
electricity purchased from another supplier over its lines because it wanted to keep 
itself in the local distribution business.82 The Court upheld the lower court’s 
finding of section 2 liability because of the defendant’s strategic dominance over 
the transmission lines in its service areas and its use of “this dominance to 
foreclose potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric power from 
outside sources of supply.”83 
While the Supreme Court has only alluded to EFD as a basis for antitrust 
liability,84 the vast majority of the circuit courts have expressly endorsed the 
essential facilities test articulated in MCI Communications.85 To prevail on an 
 
80. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. at 393–94, 397–98. 
81.  Id. at 397. (“[I]t is, as a practical matter, impossible for any railroad company to pass 
through, or even enter St. Louis, so as to be within reach of its industries or commerce, without using 
the facilities entirely controlled by the terminal company. . . . The other companies use the terminal 
properties because it is not possible to acquire adequate facilities for themselves.”) The Court found 
the joint owners of the bridge liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act since the companies created 
a “combination which is in restraint of trade.” See id. at 394. 
82. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. at 378–79. 
83. Id. at 377. 
84. The Court’s decision in Otter Tail unveils three principles that form the basis of the existing 
doctrine of essential facilities. See Davis, supra note 41, at 224. First, Otter Tail involves two separate 
markets—an upstream market, which consists of the essential facility itself, and a downstream market, 
which requires the essential facility as a critical input. Second, the owner of an essential facility may be 
subject to antitrust liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act only if it is feasible to allow 
downstream competitors to use an upstream facility. “There were no engineering factors that 
prevented Otter Tail from selling power at wholesale to those towns that wanted municipal plants or 
wheeling the power. . . . Otter Tail’s refusals to sell at wholesale or to wheel were solely to prevent 
municipal power systems from eroding its monopolistic position.” Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 378. Third, 
the owner of an essential facility must have a legitimate business justification for denying access to the 
facility. Id. at 381 (explaining that there cannot be antitrust liability if compelling Otter Tail to provide 
or wheel wholesale power to its competitors “would impair (the utility’s) ability to render adequate 
service to its [own] customers.”) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) (internal 
punctuation omitted). These components foreshadow the Seventh Circuit’s multi-element essential 
facilities test in MCI Commc’ns v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
85. See Midwest Gas Servs., Inc. v. Ind. Gas Co., 317 F.3d 703, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2003); Covad 
Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel 
Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 
148 F.3d 1080, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 748 
(3d Cir. 1996); City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1992); Del. & 
Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1990); Advanced Health-Care 
Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150 (4th Cir. 1990); City of Malden v. Union Elec. 
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essential facilities antitrust claim, the plaintiff must satisfy the following four 
elements: “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s 
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of 
the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the 
facility.”86 Satisfaction of these elements would impose a duty “on firms 
controlling an essential facility . . . to make the facility available on non-
discriminatory terms.”87 Although not explicitly mentioned in MCI, courts also 
recognize the existence of a fifth phantom element that is necessary for finding an 
antitrust violation under EFD—the presence of two vertically related markets.88 
The following highlights why BRCA gene patents satisfy every element of the 
MCI Communications essential facilities test. 
1. Myriad has Absolute Monopoly Power Over the BRCA Gene Sequences 
The first element consists of two subparts: First, the input must be 
“essential” in the sense that competitors need access to it to compete, and second, 
the entity in control of the essential facility must be a monopolist. Courts have 
generally held that an input “that is controlled by a single firm will be considered 
‘essential’ only if control of the [input] carries with it the power to eliminate 
competition in the downstream market.”89 An input is not labeled as essential 
simply because of inconvenience or cost concerns.90 Rather “denial of [an input 
 
Co., 887 F.2d 157, 160 (8th Cir. 1989); Aspen Highland Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 
1509, 1520 (10th Cir. 1984). 
86. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132–33. 
87. Id. at 1132. 
88. Id. (explaining that refusing to share an essential facility is illegal “because a monopolist’s 
control of an essential facility . . . can extend monopoly power . . . from one market into another”); 
Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. Pacificorp, 357 F.3d 1042, 1044 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[E]ssential 
facilities doctrine applies to a competitor’s refusal to deal when the competitor has monopolistic 
control over an essential facility in one market and uses that monopoly power to leverage returns 
from different markets by refusing to share access to the essential facility.”); see 3B PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 771a (3d ed. 2008); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 74, § 10.3c; Paul 
D. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to 
Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 850–55 (2003) (arguing that there is a two 
market requirement for proving an essential facilities claim). 
89. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991); see also 
Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (invoking the Alaska 
Airlines test for essentiality); Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1357 (same). 
90. See, e.g., Midwest Gas Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d at 714 (finding that a specific gas pipeline was not 
essential when other pipelines exist because “the most economical route is not an essential facility 
when other routes are available”); S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d at 1381 (“[T]he fact that [plaintiffs] 
could achieve savings at the expense of [the defendant] . . . is not enough to turn the [power lines] 
into an essential facility.”). 
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must inflict] a severe handicap” on potential competitors before an antitrust claim 
under EFD can be found.91  
The BRCA gene patents are an essential input because it is literally impossible 
to compete in the downstream gene diagnostics market for breast and ovarian 
cancers without access to the BRCA gene sequences.92 Competitors would still be 
precluded from competing in the market for genetic testing of BRCA mutations 
even if economic resources were not a limiting factor. The present case closely 
resembles the situation in Otter Tail where competitors who wanted to service the 
retail electricity market within a municipality had no choice but to wheel their 
electric power over the transmission lines that were exclusively controlled by the 
defendant. Otter Tail’s refusal to wheel power generated by outside power plants 
over its lines constituted a denial of an essential facility because it practically 
eliminated competition in the downstream market for retail distribution of 
electricity. The present case is even more compelling because unlike Otter Tail, 
which was solely concerned with maintaining a competitive market for retail 
distribution in a single municipality, Myriad’s anticompetitive conduct would 
impair competition in multiple product markets throughout the United States. 
Myriad’s refusal to license its exclusive rights to make and use BRCA gene 
sequences completely forecloses competition in improving gene diagnostic tools 
not only for breast and ovarian cancers (where the BRCA gene sequences serve as 
an input),93 but also other pathologies that the BRCA genes may be involved in.94 
The BRCA gene patents are an essential input because competitors need to obtain 
a license to use the gene sequences in order to compete in the downstream gene 
diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. 
Furthermore, Myriad, the sole patent holder of the BRCA gene patents, 
qualifies as a monopolist in the relevant upstream market for gene sequences 
under antitrust laws. The scope of Myriad’s composition of matter (i.e., product) 
patents is extremely broad because the patent claims cover both the complete 
 
91. See Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
92. BRCA gene patents can also have a detrimental effect on competition in innovation 
markets for BRCA research and gene therapy markets for diseases that are causally linked to the 
BRCA genes. 
93. PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 115–20; Cho et al., supra note 19, at 3–8; E. Richard 
Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 GENETICS MED. S39, S40–42 
(2010). 
94. Luna Kadouri et al., Letter, Cancer Risks in Carriers of the BRCA1/2 Ashkenazi Founder 
Mutations, 44 J. MED. GENETICS 461, 467–71 (2007); Deborah Thompson et al., Cancer Incidence in 
BRCA1 Mutation Carriers, 94 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1358, 1358–65 (2002); Breast Cancer Linkage 
Consortium, Cancer Risks in BRCA2 Mutation Carriers, 91 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1310, 1310–16 
(1999); see also BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www 
.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/risk/brca (last visited Nov. 9, 2011) (“Harmful BRCA1 
mutations may also increase a woman’s risk of developing cervical, uterine, pancreatic, and colon 
cancer. Harmful BRCA2 mutations may additionally increase the risk of pancreatic cancer, stomach 
cancer, gallbladder and bile duct cancer, and melanoma.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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BRCA gene sequences as well as every possible partial DNA fragment within the 
BRCA genes.95 As a result, no other entity can possess any market share for 
making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the BRCA gene sequences 
within the United States during the patent term. Myriad has exclusive control over 
the production and use of the BRCA genes, thus making it the only supplier of the 
BRCA gene sequences for every downstream medical application including 
diagnostics, therapeutics, and research.96 Myriad’s status in the market for BRCA 
gene sequences is distinguishable from the situation in Snake River Valley Electric 
Ass’n v. Pacificorp.97 In Snake River Valley Electric Ass’n, the plaintiff claimed that the 
defendant’s refusal to sell wholesale electricity constituted a violation under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act.98 The court held that there was no antitrust liability 
for the defendant’s refusal to deal because the defendant did not have a monopoly 
over wholesale energy transactions.99 In fact, there was a “vigorous competitive 
market for wholesale [electric] power” which permitted the plaintiff to purchase 
the input from many other sellers.100 Unlike the plaintiff in Snake River, 
downstream researchers and clinicians have no access to the BRCA gene 
sequences unless they secure a license from Myriad. Thus Myriad has an absolute 
monopoly over the upstream market for BRCA gene sequences, which are an 
essential input in the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. 
2. The BRCA Gene Sequences Cannot Be Duplicated Without Infringing  
Myriad’s Gene Patents 
The second element of EFD requires that there must be an “inability 
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility.”101 Most courts have 
refused to find that an input is “unable to be duplicated” simply because it 
provides the most economical means for downstream competitors to conduct 
their own business.102 Instead this language has been construed to mean that only 
 
95. U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 
1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995). 
96. See Westin, supra note 17, at 273–74, 280–81. 
97. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. Pacificorp, 357 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004). 
98. Id. at 1044. 
99. Id. at 1052. 
100. Id. 
101. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983). 
102. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“[A] plaintiff must show more than inconvenience, or even some economic loss; he must show that 
an alternative to the facility is not feasible.”). It is interesting to note that there have been a few cases 
in the past where the input was deemed as “unable to be duplicated” even though a very large 
expenditure would have made such duplication possible. Compare Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding short haul railroad tracks covering the east coast 
of the United States “unable to be duplicated” because “physical duplication of [defendant’s] lines 
would be an impractical and unreasonable project to undertake”) (quoting Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. 
Consol. Rail. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (N.D.N.Y. 1989), rev’d, 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990)), with 
Corsearch, Inc. v. Thomson & Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305, 332–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding online 
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a literal inability will satisfy this element, making it a relatively high bar for 
antitrust plaintiffs to clear. For example, in City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant utility company’s refusal to transmit power to 
the city under a favorable tariff gave rise to antitrust liability because the 
defendant’s transmission line was the only practical means for the city to obtain 
outside power.103 However, the court found that the defendant’s transmission 
facilities were susceptible to duplication because there were at least five 
alternatives the plaintiff could have used to transmit the necessary power, albeit at 
greater expense. By contrast, the inability to duplicate the patented BRCA gene 
sequences is not a matter of economic feasibility. It is in fact impossible to 
duplicate the relevant gene sequences without infringing Myriad’s composition of 
matter patents on the BRCA gene sequences.104 Researchers would be barred 
from generating the BRCA gene sequences in their own laboratories regardless of 
the method used to produce them105 or whether they play a minor or peripheral 
role in the operation of the new invention.106 Researchers would be violating 
Myriad’s patent rights even if they used a tiny fragment of the BRCA genes in 
their inventions. The patented BRCA gene sequences thus qualify as an input that 
is unable to be “practically or reasonably” duplicated. 
3. Myriad Has Denied its Competitors in the Gene Diagnostic Market  
Access to the BRCA Gene Sequences 
The third element of EFD consists of two subparts: First, the monopolist 
denies access to the essential input by either flatly refusing to deal with a party or 
offering to deal only on unreasonable terms,107 and second, the party seeking 
 
state trademark computer database “able to be duplicated” because plaintiff could have built its own 
database at an affordable price). 
103. City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 160–61 (8th Cir. 1989). 
104. See U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 
7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995). 
105. A well-established principle in patent law is that the broad scope of a product patent is 
not restricted by the disclosed method of production. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the scope of Amgen’s patent on the 
erythropoietin (epo) gene sequence was not restricted to the product that was a result of the method 
disclosed in the patent); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 
1390 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that Scripps’ product patent on human blood clotting protein factor 
VIII:C was infringed regardless of the method of production used). 
106. See Westin, supra note 17, at 281. It is important to note that if the patent claims to the 
BRCA gene sequences only extended to those gene sequences isolated by the process disclosed in the 
patent and there were other options of duplicating the BRCA genes, the second element of the 
essential facilities analysis would not be satisfied. 
107. See Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 902 F.2d at 179–80 (“[T]here need not be an outright refusal 
to deal in order to find that denial of an essential facility occurred. It is sufficient if the terms of the 
offer to deal are unreasonable.”). The court in Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. explained that demanding an 
eight hundred percent rate increase for the same exact service that the defendant provided for the 
plaintiff in the past was unreasonable. See id. at 177. 
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access is, in fact, in competition with the monopolist in an identifiable market.108 
In other words, “there must be a market in which [the] plaintiff and [the] 
defendant compete, such that a monopolist extends its monopoly to the 
downstream market by refusing access to the facility it controls.”109 
Myriad has a monopoly in the upstream market for supplying access to the 
BRCA gene sequences because its gene patents grant the firm an exclusive right to 
make, use, and sell the BRCA gene sequences. Myriad’s potential consumers in 
this upstream market consist of entities involved in BRCA research and 
innovation, diagnostic medicine, and clinical therapeutics. This upstream 
technology market is distinct from the downstream genetic testing market where 
researchers are competing to (a) supply patients with information concerning their 
predisposition toward specific genetic disorders, (b) find ways to improve the 
overall quality of existing genetic testing services,110 and (c) design novel methods 
of diagnosing genetic disorders that were not previously possible due to technical 
hurdles.111 Myriad also competes in this downstream gene diagnostic market. 
In the present case, Myriad refuses to license its gene patents to other clinical 
labs that wish to conduct genetic tests for BRCA mutations, a downstream market 
in which Myriad competes.112 This situation is distinguishable from the Intergraph 
Corp. v. Intel Corp. case where the court held that Intel’s refusal to license its 
patents and trade secrets did not amount to an antitrust violation.113 In Intergraph 
Corp., a manufacturer of computer workstations sued Intel after Intel cut off its 
supply of microprocessors and proprietary information. Intergraph contended that 
access to Intel’s chips and trade secrets was essential to its business, and that Intel 
should be compelled to license its patents and trade secrets to Intergraph on 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. The Federal Circuit reasoned that an 
essential facilities claim could not be made out from Intel’s refusal to supply 
Intergraph with its microprocessor technology because the parties did not 
compete in any downstream market.114 In contrast, rival gene diagnostic labs can 
 
108. Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1088–89 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (holding that plaintiff failed to state an essential facilities claim because plaintiff could not 
establish that defendant was its competitor); see Pitofsky et al., supra note 79, at 461 (“The competitive 
relationship between the parties . . . is the touchstone of liability under the essential facilities 
doctrine.”). 
109. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
110. See LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT 
GENETICS 110–16 (2001). 
111. These examples include pre-implantation genetic screening, a form of prenatal diagnosis 
that is used to identify embryos at risk for several genetic abnormalities and paraffin embedded tissue 
testing that is used when patients and families lack access to a relative’s blood but potentially have 
access to a deceased relative’s preserved paraffin-embedded tumor sample. See Cook-Deegan et al., 
supra note 23, at S16. 
112. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 205, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); see Cho et al., supra note 19, at 3–8; see also Gold & Carbone, supra note 93, at S41–42. 
113. Intergraph Corp., 195 F.3d at 1356–59. 
114. Id. (explaining that Intergraph and Intel only shared a customer-supplier relationship and 
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satisfy the third element of EFD because (a) prior to 1997 they competed with 
Myriad in the downstream gene diagnostic market for BRCA testing,115 and (b) 
Myriad refuses to license the BRCA gene patents to its competitors on reasonable 
terms. 
4. Providing Access to the BRCA Gene Sequences Is Feasible 
The fourth element of EFD considers whether it is economically feasible for 
the controlling entity to provide access to the essential input.116 This element 
serves two purposes: (1) it limits the defendant’s obligation to share a facility if 
doing so would be unfeasible,117 and (2) it offers a legitimate business justification 
defense which excuses facially anticompetitive conduct if the defendant can prove 
that its conduct is motivated by procompetitive concerns.118 
Myriad cannot make a persuasive argument that providing access to the 
BRCA gene sequences would be unfeasible. Allowing other companies to use the 
BRCA genes to carry out their own genetic testing services would in no way 
diminish Myriad’s ability to use the gene sequences for its own business 
operations. Most laboratories have the ability to synthesize or isolate the BRCA 
gene sequences on their own, using any samples and technical processes they 
deem appropriate. Thus, an infinite number of researchers could work with the 
relevant gene sequences at any given time without disrupting each other’s 
activities.119 This situation is quite different from that described in City of Anaheim 
v. Southern California Edison Co., where the plaintiff cities were arguing for 
guaranteed access to Edison’s high-power transmission lines (the Pacific Intertie) 
that supplied hydroelectric power to Edison’s control area. Edison shared access 
to the Pacific Intertie with certain other utilities and thus was only entitled to a 
 
that a noncompetitor’s asserted need for a manufacturer’s business information does not convert the 
withholding of that information into an antitrust violation). 
115. PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 93–95, 115–19. 
116. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983). 
117. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“[A]ntitrust laws have never required a monopolist to ‘cease using its own facility so that [a 
competitor] can begin using it.’”) (quoting City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1366 
(9th Cir. 1992)); City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 163 (8th Cir. 1989) (providing 
access may be unfeasible where doing so would compel the current owner to provide access to the 
facility at a price below cost); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992–93 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(“[A]ntitrust laws do not require that an essential facility be shared if such sharing would be 
impractical or would inhibit [the owner’s] ability to serve its customers adequately.”). 
118. See City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that antitrust liability under EFD is excused if the monopolist has a legitimate business justification 
for its refusal to deal); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Res., Inc. 838 F.2d 360, 368–69 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that “the desire to maintain market power—even a monopolist’s market power—cannot 
create antitrust liability if there was a legitimate business justification for refusing to [behave in a 
certain manner]”). 
119. In economic terms, the use of gene sequences is nonrivalrous. See N. GREGORY 
MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 218–19 (6th ed. 2012). 
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certain portion of the lines’ total capacity. Edison refused to grant the plaintiffs 
access on grounds that it expected to use its full capacity rights in the Intertie to 
supply electricity into its service area. The court held that there was no antitrust 
liability for the defendant’s refusal to deal because it recognized that forcing the 
defendant to share its portion of a high-power transmission line would interfere 
with the defendant’s ability to use its facility at full capacity so as to provide cheap 
power for its own customers.120 Unlike the defendant in City of Anaheim, Myriad 
would neither have “to disable itself so that [its competitors]”121 can get access to 
the BRCA genes nor would licensing the gene patents prevent Myriad from 
providing high-quality genetic testing services to its own customers. Providing 
access to the BRCA gene patents is thus economically feasible for Myriad. 
Myriad lacks any procompetitive legitimate business justification for 
unilaterally refusing to deal with competitors in the downstream gene diagnostic 
market. Myriad could potentially allege that its unilateral refusals to deal are linked 
to (a) fully reaping the benefits of its IP rights, (b) maintaining the quality of its 
genetic testing services for BRCA mutations, (c) maintaining the nature of its 
business, and (d) its desire to remain profitable in the gene diagnostic market for 
breast and ovarian cancers. The following will address why each of these proffered 
defenses lack merit. 
One could argue that like the Federal Circuit’s decision in Xerox,122 Myriad’s 
refusal to license its patented product to competitors is based on a desire to profit 
from its IP rights and thus constitutes a legitimate business justification. In Xerox, 
a manufacturer of photocopiers refused to sell its patented replacement parts to 
independent service organizations (ISOs) that competed against the manufacturer 
in the downstream service market.123 The court held that a patent owner’s refusals 
to sell or license its patented invention are free from liability under antitrust laws 
because the patent owner has the statutory right to exclude others from practicing 
its claimed invention.124 But Myriad’s exclusive control over the BRCA gene 
sequences is distinguishable from the situation in Xerox because the 
anticompetitive effects of refusing to license gene patents are far greater than 
those caused by refusing to license patented mechanical parts. Despite the lack of 
access to patented parts, an ISO still has the ability to enter the photocopier 
service market, albeit at great expense, by manufacturing its own parts and 
machines. This reasoning does not apply to gene sequences, because unlike 
mechanical parts, there are no non-infringing substitutes for gene sequences.125 In 
fact, tampering with the natural gene sequence can completely alter the desirable 
 
120. City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1992). 
121. Id. 
122. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
123. Id. at 1324. 
124. Id. at 1327. 
125. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 700.  
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properties of the gene.126 Thus, Myriad’s justification that its conduct is motivated 
by its desire to maximally profit from its IP rights does not excuse the 
anticompetitive effects of its refusal to deal with competitors in the downstream 
gene diagnostic market. 
Given the less-than-optimal quality of Myriad’s genetic testing protocols 
over the past decade, the argument that Myriad’s refusals to license the BRCA 
gene patents are tied to concerns over quality control is not persuasive. Myriad’s 
BRCA testing protocols are unnecessarily expensive compared to the testing 
protocols in Europe that are just as effective or better.127 Myriad has failed to 
implement these low-cost alternatives even though some of them have been 
around since 1995.128 Furthermore, Myriad’s testing methods are deficient because 
they miss between ten to twenty percent of the expected BRCA mutations.129 This 
allegation was bolstered by the findings of a French physician who successfully 
identified a mutation in an American family that the Myriad test had missed.130 
Other patients were informed that they were positive for BRCA mutations when 
their test results were either normal or ambiguous.131 A court is thus likely to view 
this justification with a fair amount of skepticism. 
Myriad could argue that providing access to the BRCA gene patents would 
cause it “to alter the nature of its business”132 or expand into areas it was not 
already in the business of pursuing to make the facility available.133 In Cavalier 
Telephone, Cavalier, a competing local exchange carrier, alleged that Verizon, the 
incumbent local exchange carrier, was liable under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
because Verizon refused to provide Cavalier access to existing essential facilities, 
namely, Verizon’s communication network and its central offices.134 The court 
 
126. See Westin, supra note 17, at 280. 
127. See Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy, supra note 12, at 804 (“[G]eneticists in France can 
offer genetic tests for breast cancer for less than the US $2,680 fee per test that is charged by 
Myriad.”). 
128. Christine Sevilla et al., Impact of Gene Patents on the Cost-effective Delivery of Care: The Case of 
BRCA1 Genetic Testing, 19 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 287, 296 (2003) (“The results 
of our cost-effectiveness analysis strongly suggest that negative [monopolistic] effects of this kind are 
occurring in the case of BRCA1. . . . [Such monopoly control] may prevent health care systems from 
identifying and adopting the most efficient genetic testing strategies.”). 
129. Steve Benowitz, French Challenge to BRCA1 Patent Underlies European Discontent, 94 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 80, 80–81 (2002). A 2006 U.S. study later confirmed that Myriad’s testing strategy 
missed up to twelve percent of BRCA gene rearrangements. Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in 
BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1379, 1379–88 (2006). 
130. Sophie Gad et al., Letter, Identification of a Large Rearrangement of the BRCA1 Gene Using 
Colour Bar Code on Combed DNA in an American Breast/Ovarian Cancer Family Previously Studied by Direct 
Sequencing, 38 J. MED. GENETICS 388, 388–92 (2001). 
131. Ellen Matloff & Arthur Caplan, Direct to Confusion: Lessons Learned from Marketing BRCA 
Testing, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5, 7 (2008). 
132. Cavalier Tel., LLC v. Verizon Va., Inc., 330 F.3d 176, 193 (4th Cir. 2003). 
133. Id. at 188. 
134. Id. at 178. 
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rejected the essential facilities claim because Verizon had a legitimate business 
justification.135 Specifically, compelling the defendant to share its office space and 
rent its telephone lines to a competing telecommunication firm would have forced 
the defendant to expand its telecommunications business into areas it had no 
desire to explore.136 This justification would not apply to the present case because 
Myriad would not be forced to alter or expand its business into undesirable areas 
if it licensed its BRCA gene patents to other firms. Although Myriad could 
theoretically choose to expand its business by mass-producing BRCA gene 
sequences and marketing them to other researchers, the company would not be 
forced to do so.137 Instead Myriad can simply license its gene patents, thus 
allowing competitors to spend their own time and resources isolating BRCA gene 
sequences for their own business operations. 
Finally, Myriad could argue that licensing its BRCA gene patents would cause 
it to lose revenue and that its refusals to deal thus stem from its desire to remain 
profitable in the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. This 
argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, Myriad would not necessarily lose 
business in the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers by licensing 
its gene patents. It could maintain its market dominance by competing on the 
merits. Specifically, Myriad can maintain its high profits by marketing superior, 
high-quality gene testing services and building goodwill among its consumers. 
Second, Myriad would actually profit from providing access to the BRCA gene 
sequences by demanding sizable royalties in exchange for granting others 
permission to make and use the BRCA gene sequences in their inventions. A 
recent study revealed that “Myriad has yet to make a profit despite revenues from 
its diagnostics business. [This is because profitability] . . . require[s] the 
development of new products, especially therapeutic products, which offer a 
higher financial return.”138 Myriad has remained stagnant on this front because it 
has not tried to develop therapeutic products for breast and ovarian cancers either 
on its own or through strategic alliances with other firms. Myriad thus lacks any 
procompetitive legitimate business justification for refusing to license its BRCA 
gene patents. 
5. Myriad’s Monopoly over the Market for BRCA Gene Sequences Is Distinct from the 
Downstream Gene Diagnostic Market for Breast and Ovarian Cancers 
The final implied element of EFD requires that the party seeking access to 
the facility be in competition with the monopolist controlling the facility in a 
 
135. Id. at 187–88. 
136. Id.  
137. See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 88, ¶ 773e (explaining that antitrust laws do 
not impose an obligation on monopolists to “build new capacity to satisfy a would-be sharer”). 
138. Gold & Carbone, supra note 93, at S42. 
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distinct downstream market.139 By contrast, EFD does not apply when the parties 
are competitors in the market for the essential facility itself or a single integrated 
market.140 
BRCA gene sequences and gene diagnostic testing for breast and ovarian 
cancers are two distinct markets, because enough consumers wish to buy gene 
diagnostic testing services separately from gene sequences that it is efficient for 
competing diagnostic labs to offer BRCA testing services independent of the 
relevant gene sequences. Biopharmaceutical firms, clinical laboratories, and 
academic researchers are the major consumers in the upstream BRCA gene 
sequence market. In contrast, the consumers of the gene diagnostic market for 
breast and ovarian cancers consist of patients who might be at risk for developing 
breast or ovarian cancers. Myriad has an absolute monopoly in the upstream 
market for supplying BRCA gene sequences that is distinct from the downstream 
gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers which exploits the BRCA 
gene sequences.141 
The BRCA gene patents are distinguishable from the patented cotton-tipped 
swab-making machine in Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, because unlike the 
BRCA genes, the patented machine in Q-Tips was not a market in and of itself. In 
Q-Tips, the Q-tips corporation had a patent on a machine that manufactured 
cotton-tipped swabs and Johnson & Johnson argued that Q-Tips’ refusal to 
license the right to use the patented machine gave rise to antitrust liability.142 The 
court held that no antitrust violation had occurred because the defendant merely 
retained a monopoly that was legally granted to it by the government.143 The 
machine in Q-tips did not constitute an essential facility because it was a facility 
that was part of the market for cotton-tipped swabs and not an independent 
market in and of itself. Q-Tips had to participate in the cotton swabs market in 
order to reap substantial profits as the owner of a cotton-swab-producing 
machine. Unlike Q-Tips, Myriad would not even have to enter the gene diagnostic 
market for breast and ovarian cancers to be profitable. Myriad could reap 
substantial profits by simply licensing its BRCA gene sequences to 
biopharmaceutical firms and clinical research labs that exploit these gene 
 
139. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973) (holding that a private 
power company violated antitrust laws, because it attempted to prevent municipalities from creating 
their own power distribution systems). 
140. See Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D.N.J. 1951), aff’d, 207 
F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that the patentee’s refusal to license its patented machine did not 
violate antitrust laws, because the right to exclude others from using the machine “is the very 
monopoly . . . patent law grants”). 
141. In fact, there are multiple downstream markets, because BRCA sequences also have 
applications in gene therapeutic and innovation markets. 
142. Q-Tips, Inc., 109 F. Supp. at 657, 660. 
143. Id. at 660. 
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sequences for different downstream applications. Thus, the vertical “two-market” 
requirement appears to be satisfied in the present case. 
Myriad’s decision to exploit its dominant position in the BRCA gene 
sequence market to eliminate competition and illegally expand its monopoly 
power in the downstream gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers is 
exactly the sort of market overreaching EFD is designed to thwart. The above 
analysis demonstrates that Myriad’s BRCA gene patents fall within the definition 
of an essential facility and Myriad’s refusal to license these gene sequences to 
downstream competitors constitutes an antitrust violation under EFD. 
6. Dismissing Objections to the Application of EFD to Gene Patents 
a. EFD can be applied to IP 
Some scholars advocate against the application of EFD to IP cases.144 
Central to this argument is the assumption that an obligation to share IP disrupts 
incentives put in place by IP laws, which in turn stifles innovation.145 However, 
this argument overlooks the fact that EFD only applies to markets that are 
vertically related—an upstream market that supplies a facility and a related 
downstream market in which a firm cannot compete without access to the facility. 
IP owners would not be “‘ripped-off’ by a duty to share” because the IP owner’s 
“legal reward is not altered in the primary market for the product embodying its 
intellectual property.”146 Moreover, access to IP that serves as an essential input in 
downstream markets promotes innovation, increases technological output, reduces 
prices, and enhances consumer welfare.147 These policy justifications consequently 
demonstrate that “the essential facilities doctrine applies to intellectual property 
no less than to tangible assets.”148 
To the extent that the majority of cases employing EFD have involved 
tangible property, courts have never expressly held that IP is precluded from being 
an essential facility to competition. In fact, the argument that “only tangible 
physical objects are ‘facilities’ and, as such, . . . the essential facilities doctrine does 
not apply [to IP],” has not been looked upon favorably.149 For one thing, EFD has 
 
144. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 74, § 13.3c. 
145. Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why 
Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between IP and Other Property Rights, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 741, 
761 (2004). 
146. Id. 
147. See Pitofsky et al., supra note 79, at 452. 
148. Id. 
149. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (“Although the doctrine of essential facilities has been applied predominantly to 
tangible assets, there is no reason why it could not apply, as in this case, to information wrongfully 
withheld.”). 
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been widely applied to intangible assets such as services.150 Furthermore, courts 
seem to accept the notion that EFD can be applied in the context of IP.151 Thus 
far, there has not been a case where the IP rights at issue were found to be 
essential facilities152 because none of the inputs could satisfy all the elements of 
the MCI test. Given that the BRCA gene patents can unequivocally satisfy every 
element of EFD, it is reasonable to conclude that the BRCA gene patents 
constitute an essential facility for the downstream gene diagnostic market for 
breast and ovarian cancers. 
b. Application of EFD to gene patents will not deter innovation 
EFD has been criticized by a number of scholars because of two overarching 
concerns: (1) the subjectivity of determining when a facility is actually “essential” 
to downstream competition, and (2) fears that compelled access would decrease 
incentives to innovate.153 Fortunately, neither of these objections creates a true 
impediment to the application of EFD in the context of gene patents. The first 
criticism is concerned with properly defining the circumstances under which a 
single firm’s facility is classified as essential.154 Courts have addressed this fear by 
making the essentiality requirement a relatively high bar for antitrust plaintiffs to 
clear.155 Even under this elevated standard, BRCA gene patents would still qualify 
 
150. AT&T Co. v. N. Am. Indus., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 777, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that 
plaintiff “adequately alleged that the central office services refused it by [defendant] are essential 
within the meaning of the federal antitrust laws”); see Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford 
Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150–51 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that plaintiff adequately alleged that 
access to hospital patients for patient referrals constituted an essential facility). 
151. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. Mass. 1991) 
(rejecting essential facilities claim in a case involving copyrighted computer diagnostic software on the 
grounds that the copyright holder was not a monopolist, not on the grounds that the essential 
facilities doctrine is inapplicable to IP), aff’d in part and remanded, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); BellSouth 
Adver. & Publ’g Co., 719 F. Supp. at 1566 (holding that copyrighted telephone listings could be an 
essential facility necessary to the production of competing telephone directories if such listings were 
found to be truly essential), rev’d on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Montgomery 
Cnty. Ass’n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F. Supp. 804, 817 (D. Md. 1995) 
(rejecting essential facilities claim in case involving copyrighted “multiple listing service” on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence, not on the grounds that the essential facilities doctrine is 
inapplicable to IP), aff’d, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996). 
152. See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (ruling that 
an essential facilities claim could not be made out because the owner of the essential facility and the 
antitrust plaintiff did not compete in a downstream market that required access to the facility); 
Aldridge v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728, 753 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that defendant’s 
computer operating system was not an essential input into the disk caching market because plaintiff’s 
program could theoretically be run on other operating systems in the primary market).  
153. See e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 851–52 (1989). 
154. Such caution is warranted “particularly when anything [that one firm] has that another 
[competing firm] wants may be called an ‘essential facility.’” Id. at 844. 
155. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“[A] plaintiff must show more than inconvenience, or even some economic loss; he must show that 
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as essential facilities because it is not only vital to the competitive viability of 
individual gene testing labs but also the viability of the gene diagnostic market for 
breast and ovarian cancers in general. Firms that wish to enter the gene diagnostic 
market for breast and ovarian cancers cannot do so without access to the BRCA 
gene sequences. The BRCA gene sequences are not amenable to design-around 
given the broad scope of Myriad’s composition of matter patents. Nor are there 
any practical non-infringing alternatives available that can assess a patient’s risk of 
developing breast and ovarian cancers prior to manifestation of the disease. The 
first objection can thus be easily overcome given the nature of gene patents. 
The second criticism is concerned with interfering with the rights of patent 
holders and how it may subsequently deter researchers from investing in upstream 
innovation.156 Although this is a legitimate concern, it does not apply in the 
context of gene patents for two reasons. First, the publication of the Human 
Genome Project and rapid advances in gene sequencing technology have 
eliminated the need to incentivize researchers to discover upstream human gene 
sequences.157 In fact, the upstream market for patented human gene sequences 
will most likely decrease (or disappear) by the year 2020, which marks the end of 
the patent term for human gene patents that were secured in the pre-Human 
Genome Project era. Second, gene patents actually impede innovation by 
prioritizing the economic interests of upstream inventors over the need to 
incentivize subsequent technological evolution. Gene patents are more onerous 
than the average product patents because they are essential for the practice of 
every downstream invention involving the exploitation of genetic information. As 
a result, the patent owner “ultimately controls all [applications] deriving from the 
gene’s use,”158 giving her tremendous power in determining what inventions are 
practiced. This excessive concentration of power in the hands of upstream 
inventors can chill downstream innovation since gene patents enable upstream 
patent holders “to sit on their patents in order to reap profits, while blocking new 
 
an alternative to the facility is not feasible.”); City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 162 
(8th Cir. 1989) (refusing to impose antitrust liability even though the defendant’s transmission line 
was the only practical means for the city to obtain outside power); see also Aldridge, 995 F. Supp.at 753 
(“A facility is essential under the antitrust laws only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s individual 
competitive viability and the viability of the market in general.”). 
156. See Genevaz, supra note 145, at 760–61.  
157. Indeed, isolated human gene sequences that lack any newly engineered and nonobvious 
properties would no longer qualify for a patent. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(rendering gene patents whose structures were already known as of September 2000 unpatentable due 
to obviousness). 
158. Westin, supra note 17, at 281. For example in Amgen, the plaintiff accused the defendant 
of infringing its patent on the erythropoietin (epo) gene sequence because the defendant produced the 
gene using a novel cutting-edge method instead of the method disclosed in Amgen’s patents. The 
court held that the scope of Amgen’s gene patent was not restricted to the product that was a result 
of the method disclosed in the patent. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
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innovations that might substitute their own.”159 Because competition also plays a 
vital role in fostering innovation,160 overprotection of gene patent holders from 
competition can “perversely result in less, rather than more, innovation.”161 
c. EFD is still viable after Trinko 
The final concern regarding the application of EFD to the BRCA gene 
patents is the Supreme Court’s statement in Trinko that the Court “ha[s] never 
recognized [the essential facilities] doctrine.”162 However, this rhetoric is not likely 
to affect the application of EFD to the BRCA gene patents for the following four 
reasons. First, the Court’s language is merely dicta and does not expressly signal 
the demise of EFD because the Court “[found] no need either to recognize . . . or to 
repudiate [the essential facilities doctrine].”163 Second, even though the Court never 
invoked the “essential facilities” label, it has previously applied the doctrine’s 
underlying principles to compel access to a facility that was essential to 
competition in a related downstream market.164 Third, the situation in Trinko is 
completely distinguishable from the present case involving the BRCA gene 
patents. In Trinko, the Court declined to apply EFD because it found that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996165 imposes an obligation on dominant firms to 
share their telephone networks with competitors.166 Unlike Trinko, gene patents 
are not subject to any sort of regulatory regime167 and EFD may be the sole means 
for downstream gene diagnostic firms to gain access to this essential input. 
Fourth, many federal courts construe Trinko as imposing limits on EFD rather 
than eviscerating it, and still continue to entertain essential facilities antitrust 
claims.168 It thus appears that EFD is still viable after Trinko, and thus has no 
effect on its application to the BRCA gene patents. 
 
159. Wang, supra note 48, at 275–76. 
160. Rai, supra note 48, at 831–44. 
161. Lao, supra note 63, at 214. 
162. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).  
163. Id. (emphasis added). 
164. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377–78 (1973) (alluding to each 
of the elements for an essential facilities test later articulated in MCI). The Supreme Court’s 
contributions to the underlying principles of EFD are highlighted in note 62.  
165. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)). 
166. Id. at 411. 
167. In fact, patent law confers strong protections against compulsory sharing. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(d)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“No patent owner . . . shall be . . . deemed guilty of misuse or 
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . refused to license or use any rights to 
the patent.”). 
168. Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 541 (E.D. Tex. 
2004) (stating “limitation [imposed by Trinko] has no bearing on Z-Tel’s claims”); N.Y. Mercantile 
Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 559, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing 
“some of the constraints [the Trinko Court] imposed on the essential facility doctrine”); see, e.g., Covad 
Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Trinko to hold 
that “[w]here a state or federal agency is authorized to compel access to a competitor’s infrastructure, 
. . . an essential facilities claim should be denied”); see also Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. 
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B. The Duty to Deal Under Aspen Skiing Provides an Alternate Basis  
for Imposing Antitrust Liability on Gene Patent Holders 
To the extent that the shelf life of EFD may be limited in light of Trinko, a 
patent owner’s conduct of unilaterally refusing to license its gene sequences to 
downstream competitors may also constitute exclusionary conduct under section 2 
of the Sherman Act. Under a duty to deal claim, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant’s specific refusal to deal constitutes anticompetitive conduct that 
contributes to monopolization. Although there is no general antitrust duty to deal, 
this does not mean that a firm’s right to refuse to deal is unqualified.169 Refusals to 
deal may be subject to scrutiny under section 2 if they extend, preserve, create, or 
threaten to create significant market power.170 In Aspen Skiing, a dominant ski 
resort operator who owned three of the four ski mountains in a town, 
discontinued a business arrangement with the plaintiff, its only competitor. The 
action was apparently taken to eliminate its competitor and to monopolize the ski 
resort business in the town. The Court held that a dominant firm’s refusal to 
continue to do business with its competitors in the absence of a legitimate 
business justification constitutes a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.171  
Myriad’s refusals to deal with competing diagnostic labs should be a basis for 
section 2 antitrust liability because the sole objective behind its conduct was to 
foreclose competition in the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian 
cancers. In Lorain Journal, the Court held that a monopolist newspaper’s refusals to 
sell advertising space to merchants who also purchased air advertising time from 
its competitor, a local radio station, was a section 2 violation of the Sherman 
Act.172 While acknowledging that a private business has the right to refuse to deal 
with specific customers, the Court held that the exercise of this right for the 
purpose of monopolization violates the Sherman Act.173 Like the monopolist firm 
in Lorain Journal, Myriad refused to license the BRCA gene sequences to any 
researchers that utilized gene testing protocols that competed (or had the potential 
to compete) with Myriad’s own gene testing services.174 Myriad thus chose to 
forsake short-term profits in the form of licensing royalties in order to 
monopolize the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. 
 
PacifiCorp, 357 F.3d 1042, 1044 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (invoking MCI’s essential facilities test after 
Trinko was decided, though not citing the Trinko decision). 
169. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585, 601 (1985)). 
170. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 74, § 13.3d. 
171. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 610–11. 
172. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–55 (1951). 
173. Id. at 155. 
174. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In 
2005, Dr. Matloff sought permission from Myriad for the Yale DNA Diagnostics Lab to conduct 
screening for mutations caused by large rearrangements, which Myriad was not conducting at the 
time. Her request was denied.”). 
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One could argue that the outcome of Lorain Journal turned on the fact that it 
involved conditional refusals to deal and should thus be distinguished from the 
unilateral refusals to deal in the Myriad controversy.175 To the extent that Lorain 
Journal can be characterized as a case dealing with conditional refusals to deal as 
opposed to “pure” unilateral refusals to deal, it is nonetheless applicable to the 
present case. In Lorain Journal the defendant’s willingness to deal was conditioned 
on its customers agreeing not to purchase advertising time from its competitor.176 
Likewise, Myriad only deals with parties who agree to abide by its own 
anticompetitive licensing conditions. Specifically, licensees are precluded from 
competing against Myriad in the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian 
cancers. In fact, licensees are only permitted to conduct confirmatory testing of 
Myriad’s initial BRCA test results and are barred from retesting a significant 
number of Myriad’s positive results and all of Myriad’s negative results, thus 
destroying any opportunity to improve the quality of BRCA genetic testing.177 
Most clinical labs would have no incentive to accept Myriad’s licensing agreement 
because the terms effectively prevent them from vigorously competing in the gene 
diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers. The present situation enables 
Myriad to maintain its dominant status and charge consumers supracompetitive 
prices for its mediocre BRCA genetic testing services. Myriad ultimately succeeded 
in monopolizing the gene diagnostic market for breast and ovarian cancers and is 
currently the sole provider of all BRCA genetic testing in the United States. 
C. Limitations on Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Refusals to License IP 
Antitrust law cannot treat all refusals to license patent rights like non-IP 
related refusals to deal because of the statutory protections of the Patent Act.178 
Based on the statutory language, one can infer that the patent owner has no 
obligation to license its patent to others. Federal patent law thus allows a patent 
holder to deny others access to the area claimed by the invention. It would thus be 
incongruous to blindly apply the Aspen Skiing rule in cases involving a patentee’s 
unilateral refusal to deal because doing so “would directly contravene the explicit 
statutory protections of the . . . [patent] system.”179 
But the statutory protections of patent law do not shield patent owners from 
all antitrust liability. While the patent statute explicitly allows a patentee to bar 
competitors from the area claimed by the invention, it does not address whether a 
 
175. See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 74, § 13.4b2 (noting that the rules 
governing conditional refusals to deal are quite different from those that pertain to unilateral refusals 
to deal). 
176. Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 148. 
177. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 207. 
178. The Patent Act grants the patent holder the exclusive right to make, use, or otherwise 
exploit its invention for a limited time. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
179. Lao, supra note 63, at 198. 
UCILR V3I2 Assembled v8.7 (Do Not Delete) 1/22/2014  4:12 PM 
462 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:431 
 
patentee’s refusal to license a patent may be considered an antitrust violation if the 
practice bars others from participating in a related or downstream market in which 
the firm would have otherwise faced competition.180 If there were no limits to the 
scope of the patent grant, the patent holder would have unrestricted freedom to 
set any licensing conditions it desires while being completely immune to antitrust 
liability. The fact that the Supreme Court has held that tying arrangements 
involving patents are subject to antitrust laws,181 demonstrates that the statutory 
protections of the Patent Act are limited to the area of the grant. 
Some federal appellate courts have agreed that a monopolist’s refusal to 
license an IP right can be the basis of antitrust liability in limited circumstances—
particularly where an IP owner leverages its monopoly in one market to 
substantially foreclose competition in a related downstream market.182 In an 
attempt to harmonize the principles of both antitrust law and patent law, several 
circuit courts have held that an IP owner’s refusal to deal with competitors based 
on a desire to profit from its IP rights is a presumptively legitimate business 
justification.183 This presumption can nonetheless be rebutted by showing that the 
procompetitive effects of a firm asserting its IP rights are outweighed by the 
anticompetitive effects of its conduct.184 In Grumman, a manufacturer refused to 
license its copyrighted software to third party maintainers who competed against it 
in the downstream service market.185 The court found that the plaintiffs were 
unable to rebut the presumption that the defendant’s refusal to license was not 
exclusionary because there was no evidence that competitive conditions existed in 
the service market before the defendant chose to discontinue dealing with its 
competitors.186 The court thus determined that it was inappropriate to impose a 
duty to deal on the defendant IP owner since there was no showing of 
anticompetitive conduct. 
Unlike Grumman, antitrust plaintiffs can overcome the presumption that 
Myriad’s refusal to license the BRCA patents is not exclusionary because 
competitive conditions prevailed in the gene diagnostic market for breast and 
ovarian cancers before Myriad exercised its rights not to deal with other gene 
diagnostic labs. Prior to 1997, there were four major providers of BRCA genetic 
testing: University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory, OncorMed, 
 
180. Id. 
181. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1947); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. 
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1942). 
182. Image Technical Serv. v. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d 1195, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 1997); Data 
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) (determining whether 
there is anticompetitive conduct “turns on a comparison of the behavior of firms in a competitive 
market . . . with a monopolist’s behavior once competition has been curtailed”), abrogated on other 
grounds. 
183. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219; Grumman, 36 F.3d at 1187. 
184. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219–20; see Grumman, 36 F.3d at 1187 n.64. 
185. Grumman, 36 F.3d at 1154. 
186. Id. at 1188–89. 
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Genetics and IVF Institute, and Myriad.187 Prices for BRCA testing ranged from 
seven hundred to four thousand dollars and each testing center utilized its own 
genetic testing protocols, provided varying degrees of post-test clinical care, and 
offered variable forms of specialized genetic counseling.188 Beginning in 1997, 
Myriad dispatched cease-and-desist letters to its competitors in the gene diagnostic 
market while simultaneously refusing to license its BRCA gene patents.189 Myriad 
successfully drove the other BRCA testing providers out of the market by 1999, 
making it the sole provider of gene diagnostic testing for breast and ovarian 
cancers in the United States.190 Myriad’s present monopoly status allows it to 
charge a high premium (approximately $3120 per patient) for its less-than-optimal 
BRCA testing services.191 Furthermore, Myriad does not offer patients the 
specialized genetic counseling services that were previously available through its 
competitors.192 A court is thus likely to conclude that (1) Myriad’s present 
monopoly status was not obtained through competition on the merits, and (2) 
Myriad’s refusals to deal unjustifiably harm the competitive process by frustrating 
consumer preferences and erecting barriers to competition.193 
Furthermore, the categorical deference to the rights of the patent owner is 
inappropriate in the present case given the inextricable links between gene 
sequences and lifesaving inventions that promote public health. Accurate gene 
diagnostic testing is extremely beneficial to consumers because it can help patients 
identify their risk for certain diseases prior to the appearance of symptoms and 
facilitates informed medical decision making. Although rare, there are cases where 
courts have even refused to enforce infringed patents because of overriding public 
health concerns.194 A classic case is Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Found., where the patent owner refused to license its process of irradiating 
foodstuffs to increase vitamin D content in margarine.195 Increasing vitamin D 
was helpful in the treatment of rickets and making increased vitamin D available in 
a low-cost item like margarine made it accessible to the poor. The court concluded 
that the patent owner’s refusal to license its process justified the denial of the 
 
187. PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 93–95. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 115–19; Cho et al., supra note 19, at 3–8. 
190. PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 116. 
191. Benowitz, supra note 129, at 80–81; Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 23, at S16–17; Walsh 
et al., supra note 129, at 1380; see Gad et al., supra note 130, at 388–92. 
192. PARTHASARATHY, supra note 26, at 119. 
193. See supra Part II.A.4 for a complete discussion of why Myriad lacks any procompetitive 
legitimate business justifications for its refusal to license the BRCA gene patents. 
194. City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (refusing to 
enjoin infringement because doing so “would close the sewage plant, leaving the entire community 
without any means for the disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby 
polluting its waters and endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining communities”); 
see also Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Res. Found., 146 F.2d 941, 944–45 (9th Cir. 1945). 
195. Vitamin Technologists, Inc., 146 F.2d at 954. 
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patent holder’s request for injunctive relief.196 Likewise, refusals to deal involving 
patented gene sequences should be subject to antitrust liability as a matter of 
public policy. 
III. ANTITRUST LAW PROVIDES REMEDIES THAT PROMOTE INNOVATION  
AND COMPETITION 
To the extent that EFD and refusal to deal claims deter patent owners from 
engaging in anticompetitive conduct, antitrust law may provide plaintiffs with 
necessary injunctive relief in the form of compulsory licensing. The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that compulsory patent licensing is a recognized antitrust 
remedy,197 albeit a rarely implemented one. The use of compulsory licensing as an 
antitrust remedy is justified when necessary to prevent against the continued 
monopolization in a market and can thus be viewed as akin to essential facility 
doctrine or refusal to deal law. Compulsory licensing is an appropriate remedy in 
the context of gene patents because it restores competition in the biomedical 
industry by allowing competitors in downstream gene based technology markets 
(particularly the gene diagnostic market) access to the defendant’s upstream 
patented gene sequences at reasonable rates. Nondiscriminatory access to gene 
sequences would lower barriers to entry for new competitors and increase 
technological output in gene diagnostics, gene therapy, and personalized medicine. 
The use of compulsory licensing in this case is even more compelling given the 
close links between gene patents and public health concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
Broad gene patents impede innovation and stymie market competition in the 
genetic diagnostic markets. This impediment can be attributed to (1) the nature of 
the gene diagnostic market where a patent owner typically has exclusive rights to 
both the gene and a genetic testing method for the patented gene and (2) the fact 
that existing gene patents are almost impossible to invalidate under current patent 
law.198 These conditions provide a patent holder with strong incentives to refuse 
to license its gene patents to competitors who specialize in genetic testing. In 
addition to impairing the gene diagnostic market, such anticompetitive conduct 
 
196. Id. at 954–56. 
197. Besser Mfg. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952) (“[C]ompulsory patent licensing is 
a well-recognized remedy where patent abuses are proved in antitrust actions and it is required for 
effective relief.” ); see also United States v. Glaxo Grp., 410 U.S 52, 64 (1973). 
198. The Federal Circuit recently upheld the validity of the BRCA gene patents and explained 
that the patentability of isolated gene sequences was not affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mayo Collaborative Services. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1326–29 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“While Mayo and earlier decisions concerning method claim patentability provide valuable 
insights and illuminate broad, foundational principles, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty 
and Funk Brothers set out the primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of compositions of 
matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”). 
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poses a serious threat to advances in gene therapy and personalized medicine as 
the lines between diagnostics and therapy become increasingly blurred199 and the 
field of medical genetics shifts from single gene analysis to full genome analysis.200 
Antitrust law offers a well-tailored solution to most of the dilemmas posed by 
gene patents through the application of EFD or under the more general refusal to 
deal theory. These proposed solutions deter patent owners from engaging in 
anticompetitive conduct without eliminating the economic incentives associated 
with gene patents. Furthermore, antitrust law can provide plaintiffs with 
nondiscriminatory access to indispensable research tools, thereby facilitating the 
advancement of cutting-edge gene-based technologies. 
  
 
199. Filip De Corte, Licensing in the Medical Sector, in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 
supra note 14, at 87, 97. “The industry is moving towards an era where diagnostics and 
pharmaceuticals will go even closer hand in hand. A world can be envisaged where the diagnostic tool 
is actually part of the package of the drug. Or . . . the drug is part of the package of the diagnostic 
tool.” Id. 
200. COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN RESEARCH AND 
INNOVATION, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH 42–43 (Stephen 
A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006). 
